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Abstract 
It has been argued that consensus on the responsibility to protect (R2P) was lost in the 
UN Security Council as a result of the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011. This 
argument assumes that there was more agreement on R2P before the Libyan intervention 
than there was afterwards. Yet a close examination of the Security Council’s use of 
language on R2P shows the opposite: R2P was highly contentious within the Security 
Council prior to the Libyan intervention, and less so afterwards. Not only has the Council 
used R2P language more frequently since 2011, but also negotiating this language has 
become quicker and easier. To demonstrate this I compare negotiations on Darfur with 
deliberations during and after the Arab Spring. Resolution 1706 on Darfur was the first 
time the Security Council referred to R2P in a country-specific resolution – and indeed 
it was the only country-specific resolution to refer to R2P before 2011 – making it an apt 
point of comparison. Via focused analysis on how the language used in Security Council 
resolution evolves over time, this article demonstrates that the Council has found ‘agreed 
language’ on R2P that is acceptable to members, both for thematic resolutions and 
country-specific resolutions. Language on R2P in Security Council resolutions has 
shifted from contentious to commonplace.  
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Introductioni 
Within weeks of the conflict escalating in Libya in 2011 the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolutions 1970 and 1973. These resolutions were unusually quick and 
decisive. The two resolutions referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal 
Court, created an arms embargo and targeted sanctions, authorised the use of force, and 
created a no-fly zone over Libya. These two resolutions, and particularly 1973 which 
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authorised the no-fly zone, have provoked intense debate in the years that followed. 
Significantly, Resolution 1973 marked the first time the Security Council authorised the 
non-consensual use of force for the protection of civilians against a functioning state 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 825; Glanville, 2013: 325). Given this, it represents a 
decisive example of implementing the coercive aspects of the responsibility to protect 
(R2P). The outcome of regime change in Libya has opened up debates over the 
implementation of R2P.   
Many have argued that there has been a backlash against R2P after the Libyan 
intervention. For example, Gareth Evans argued that ‘consensus fell away’ after Libya 
(2012). Likewise, Ramesh Thakur has said that the international consensus on R2P has 
been damaged by the Libyan intervention (2013: 72). Graham Cronogue took this a step 
further and argued ‘The legacy of NATO’s overreach in Libya will make Russia and 
China extremely hesitant to approve the Responsibility to Protect in the future’ (2012: 
151). While NATO’s actions in Libya, particularly on regime change, have been 
contentious these arguments assume that there was more consensus on R2P in the 
Security Council before the Arab Spring than there was afterwards. Some have 
challenged this argument by showing that the Security Council used R2P in resolutions 
more often in the two years after Libya than it had used it prior to 2011 (Bellamy, 2014: 
26; Weiss, 2014: 10). Frequent use of R2P language is part of the change, but the ease 
and speed with which R2P language has been included in Council resolutions since Libya 
also represents a significant shift.  
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To demonstrate the depth of this change, this article draws on the case of Darfur. 
Libyan Resolution 1970 was the second country-specific resolution to include language 
on R2P, while Darfur Resolution 1706 was the first. It took six months to negotiate 
Resolution 1706 on Darfur in 2006, and language on R2P proved to be one of the most 
difficult aspects. The following year, there was insufficient agreement to refer to R2P 
again in a resolution on Darfur, and this language was removed from an early draft. This 
contrasts strongly with the period from 2011 onwards, beginning with Libya, where the 
Council has routinely included language on R2P in resolutions. These negotiations have 
been quick and language on R2P has not been a major obstacle in the negotiations. 
Language on R2P has become more acceptable to Security Council members over time, 
and the Libyan resolutions in 2011 mark the turning point.  
This article focuses on the way language on R2P has been used in Security 
Council resolutions and how it has changed over time. Resolutions are the strongest form 
of decision the Security Council makes, and can be legally binding, but this article 
analyses the politics of drafting resolutions rather than their legal effects.ii While there is 
literature which discusses the language of specific Council resolutions, there have been 
few sustained studies on the language in Security Council resolutions more broadly.iii To 
analyse the politics of language in Security Council negotiations – and R2P language 
more specifically - this article proceeds in two parts. The first section discusses the 
significance of language within the Security Council, which can be resistant to 
innovation, but new language can become routinized over time. The second section takes 
a chronological approach to the Security Council’s use of language on R2P in resolutions, 
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divided into three phases of the Council’s engagement with R2P: from the early stages 
of R2P in 2001 to 2006; 2007-2010 when R2P was rarely cited; and 2011-2014 with 
regular language on R2P from the Libyan resolutions onwards. In doing so I show that 
language on R2P was highly divisive and rarely used by the Council until 2011, and it 
has been used more frequently since and negotiations have been easier and quicker.  
 
Security Council negotiations and language 
The factors involved in individual Security Council decisions are myriad, so to evidence 
change we should look for broader trends in how the Council engages with situations of 
mass atrocity crimes (Bellamy, 2015: 98-102). Looking at shifts in language is one way 
to show these broader trends. As argued by Fierke, rather than asking whether language 
is important in international politics, we should ask how and why language is important 
(2002: 331 and 351). There are three key reasons why language used in Security Council 
resolutions is important to the process of decision-making: language is not static and 
evolves as shared understandings change; the wording of resolutions informs future 
resolutions; and repetition of language is a form of reaffirmation. This section unpacks 
the implications of these three aspects of decision-making, before turning to language on 
R2P more specifically.  
First, the interpretation and use of language in the Security Council is not static 
and reflects a negotiated balance of what was acceptable to members at a particular 
moment in time. The very scope of the Council’s mandate – to maintain international 
peace and security – has been interpreted and reinterpreted over time, expanding the 
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Council’s work into new areas (Yamashita, 2007). Resolution 688 on Iraq in 1991, for 
example, represented an evolution in the Council’s practice by determining that the 
transboundary effects of internal repression could constitute a threat to international 
peace and security (Wheeler, 2000: 139-171). This reinterpretation of what constituted 
an ‘international threat’ enlarged the scope of the Security Council’s mandate, via shared 
interpretations of language. Some states expressed strong concerns about the precedent 
effects of Resolution 688 at the time, however there was sufficient support within the 
Council for this evolution to occur (Stromseth, 1993: 86-88). The language in resolutions 
therefore represents a ‘snapshot’ showing the political compromise that was widely 
supported by Security Council members at a given point in time.  
Second, drafting resolutions is both political and routine: innovation in language 
can be intensely political, and yet repeated language can become routine over time. Use 
of language on the protection of civilians illustrates this pattern of behaviour. As 
explained by Holt et al, language on the protection of ‘civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence’ was originally negotiated for a peacekeeping mandate in Sierra Leone 
in 1999 and was carefully caveated as Council members recognised the precedent effects 
of this innovation. Since then however, it has become standard phrasing in peacekeeping 
mandates for different conflicts (2009: 36-47). This is because Security Council members 
value ‘previously agreed language’ as it is easier to find agreement on language which 
states have accepted in the past (Author Interview, 2011b; Dunne and Gifkins, 2011: 
523). The language used in previous resolutions becomes the starting point for future 
negotiations. Indeed, as Neumann (2007) argues, the language used in foreign policy 
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decision-making has a particular inertia and tendency towards repetition.iv The 
negotiated wording of resolutions shapes future deliberations as Council members value 
precedent in resolutions.v  
Third, repeated use of phrases in Security Council resolutions is not simple 
automation, devoid of meaning: repetitive practices involve reaffirmation of shared 
meanings (Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 17). As explained by Neumann, when drafting 
foreign policy documents: ‘the policy had to be repeated, if not it would be weakened’ 
(emphasis in original 2007: 190). This was the approach taken by an official involved in 
the early R2P negotiations – that R2P language needed to appear in Security Council 
resolutions, otherwise it would seem that the Council was not serious about R2P (Author 
Interview, 2011a). Repetition of language in resolutions is both a reflection of the social 
environment at a given point and also shapes the future resolutions, given the preference 
for ‘previously agreed language’.  
The language that appears in Security Council resolutions – whether innovative 
or repetitive – is the end result of multilateral negotiations at the highest level. When 
analysed in conjunction with other sources and statements, this language can offer insight 
into the informal processes by which decisions were reached. The use of R2P language 
in Security Council resolutions shows that the Council discusses R2P regularly in their 
internal negotiations, both in relation to specific conflicts and broader thematic issues. 
Language on R2P in Security Council resolutions demonstrates this pattern of early 
resistance through to broad acceptance. Early uses of R2P language in Council 
resolutions in 2006 were strongly resisted and only possible because it was championed 
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by activist states inside the Council. This was followed by a period from 2007 to 2010 
when using R2P language was too difficult politically and advocates in the Council 
accepted the political realities. The use of R2P language became routinized and repetitive 
from 2011 onwards. In recent years R2P has become ‘part of the world’s diplomatic 
language’ (Welsh, 2013: 378).  
In the case of R2P this will not lead to automaticity in the way the Council 
responds to crises, given the case-by-case nature of the R2P agreement and the political 
nature of the Council (on this see Brown, 2003; Welsh, 2013). However, framing 
situations in relation to R2P helps promote the ‘responsibility to consider’ how best to 
respond to mass atrocity crimes, which Welsh shows is a key strength of R2P (emphasis 
in original 2013: 368). R2P has become a ‘commonly accepted frame of reference’ within 
international politics through which states consider their responses to mass atrocity 
crimes (Bellamy, 2011b: 1). Regular inclusion of R2P language in Security Council 
resolutions demonstrates that R2P is a regular feature of the internal negotiations within 
the Council. While R2P advocates clearly recognise that R2P will only ever be one aspect 
of the Council’s decision-making (Bellamy, 2015: 72; Welsh, 2013; 387-389) the regular 
inclusion of R2P within the Council’s internal deliberations and resolutions shows that 
Council members are considering their responses within the remit of R2P.  
 
R2P in Security Council resolutions 
The UN Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace 
and security, so resolutions regularly include language on the responsibilities of parties 
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to a conflict and on the protection needs of populations. Given this, we need a way to 
ascertain when the Security Council is referring to the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity – 
as outlined at the 2005 World Summit – and when they are discussing broader protection 
responsibilities. Similar to Morris (2013: 1267) and the Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect (2014a), I consider three different forms of language to 
constitute a reference to R2P by the UN Security Council. First and most explicitly, I 
consider invocations of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit outcome 
document. Second, I consider the phrases ‘responsibility to protect’ and ‘responsibility 
for the protection’. Third, I consider the phrase ‘responsibility of [government] to 
protect’. Since the term ‘responsibility to protect’ was coined as the title of the 2001 
ICISS report, I take 2001 as the starting point for my analysis which goes until the end 
of 2014.vi 
There have been three distinct phases of engagement with R2P by the UN 
Security Council. First, between 2001 and 2006 R2P language was highly contentious 
and rarely used. Prior to the 2005 World Summit, there were two resolutions on Darfur 
which used R2P language in relation to mass atrocity crimes. This suggests that some 
individual Council members were becoming engaged with R2P at this time, but without 
formal agreement on what R2P meant to the UN as a whole. Once the UN General 
Assembly endorsed R2P in 2005 there was a push within the Council to include R2P in 
resolutions which was met with considerable resistance, and only occurred in three 
resolutions in 2006. Second, between 2007 and 2010 R2P only appeared in one Security 
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Council resolution. Annual debates on R2P  in the UN General Assembly began in 2009, 
along with annual reports on R2P from the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), which helped 
to foster shared understandings on R2P and how it can be implemented (Bellamy, 2011a: 
26-50). For example, the 2014 debate was characterised by stronger support for R2P and 
a focus on how it can be implemented (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 
2014b). Attempts by states to ‘misapply’ R2P to the cases of Iraq, Cyclone Nargis and 
South Ossetia also helped to clarify the meaning and scope of the concept (Badescu and 
Weiss, 2010). This period was instrumental in building support and understanding on 
R2P. Third, from 2011 to 2014, beginning with Libya, the Council’s references to R2P 
in resolutions increased sharply. After only using R2P language once in the four years 
prior to 2011, the Council referred to R2P in 26 resolutions between 2011 and 2014. The 
following section unpacks these three phases of engagement with R2P.  
 
Early steps in the Security Council: 2001-2006 
Prior to the 2005 World Summit, there were two resolutions on Darfur which included 
language and statements on R2P.vii These examples are caveated, however, as there was 
no agreed meaning on R2P within the UN prior to 2005. In September 2004 Resolution 
1564 on Darfur recalled that ‘the Sudanese Government bears the primary responsibility 
to protect its population’ (UN, 2004c: 2). It has been argued that the use of this language 
prior to the 2005 World Summit was not connected to R2P (Loiselle, 2013: 331-332). 
However, there is evidence to suggest a link between the use of this phrase on Darfur and 
the ICISS report. First, by the time Resolution 1564 passed, there had been links made 
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between the situation in Darfur and the ICISS report by UNSG Kofi Annan and by the 
International Crisis Group (Evans, 2004; UN, 2004d). This shows that there were high-
level discussions and diplomacy linking Darfur and R2P, prior to the 2005 agreement. 
Second, in the statements after the vote for Resolution 1564 one Security Council 
member, the Philippines, clearly invoked language from the ICISS report in their 
statement (Williams and Bellamy, 2005: 27). Echoing the ICISS report, the Ambassador 
to the Philippines said ‘A State has the responsibility to protect its citizens, and, if it is 
unable or unwilling to do so, the international community — the Security Council — has 
the moral and legal authority to enable that State to assume that responsibility’ (UN, 
2004a: 12). By the time Resolution 1564 passed there had been connections made 
between Darfur and the ICISS version of R2P, both inside and outside the Security 
Council. This suggests that the phrasing in Resolution 1564 may have had a deliberate 
connection to the ICISS report, although without an agreed understanding on the scope 
of R2P.  
This pattern was repeated two months later in November 2004. Resolution 1574 
on Darfur and southern Sudan included references to R2P in the text of the resolution 
and in statements made after the vote. The resolution recalled ‘the primary responsibility 
of the Sudanese Government to protect its population’ (UN, 2004e). Again, some 
statements made after the vote suggested a connection to the ICISS report. The United 
Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands made statements on the responsibility of the 
Sudanese government to provide protection for civilians (UN, 2004b). The inclusion of 
R2P language in these two resolutions, and the statements made by members, suggests 
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that individual Council members were becoming engaged with the ICISS version of R2P 
during 2004. 
This needs to be carefully caveated, however, as there was no formal agreement 
on R2P at this time, and debates over the scope and meaning of R2P were taking place 
in parallel leading up to the 2005 World Summit. The Council’s engagement with R2P 
after the World Summit can be explicitly linked to the agreed meaning of R2P, so Table 
1 shows uses of R2P in resolutions from the World Summit until the end of 2014.  
 
Table 1 goes here 
 
Following the 2005 World Summit, the Security Council’s first use of R2P in a resolution 
was neither thematic nor country-specific but regional on the Great Lakes region. 
Resolution 1653 underscored that ‘governments in the region have a primary 
responsibility to protect their populations’ (UN, 2006f: 3). Statements made at the time 
of the vote show that some Council members and other participants had the World 
Summit version of R2P in mind when drafting this resolution. Slovakia and Denmark, 
who were both members of the Security Council at the time, discussed R2P in statements 
prior to the vote (UN, 2006a: 18 and 20). Canada and Norway also participated in this 
meeting and both referred to R2P, and Canada explicitly cited the World Summit 
agreement (UN, 2006b: 2 and 46).  
Following these early steps, it took six months of difficult negotiations for the 
Security Council to formally endorse the World Summit agreement on R2P, highlighting 
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how resistant the Security Council can be to innovations in language. This occurred in a 
thematic resolution on the protection of civilians in armed conflict in April 2006. The 
states who wanted to promote R2P – particularly the UK and France – worked hard to 
secure language on R2P against considerable resistance. Resolution 1674 specifically 
recalled ‘paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity’ (UN, 2006d: 2). The Security Council’s 
engagement with R2P at this time was far from inevitable. The UK circulated an early 
draft of Resolution 1674 in November 2005 – six months prior to the adoption of the 
resolution – which included language on R2P (Security Council Report, 2005). Early in 
these negotiations there was strong resistance in the Council from China and Russia, 
while the UK, France and Denmark led the drive towards the resolution (Security Council 
Report, 2006a). Reaffirming the commitment to R2P was a priority for the UK and 
France, and the UK in particular used bilateral negotiations with other permanent 
members of the Council to advocate for support (Security Council Report, 2006c). China 
agreed to the inclusion of R2P in the resolution in March 2006 – as long as it was the 
same language used at the World Summit – and Russia was the last permanent member 
to agree to endorse R2P in the Council (Security Council Report, 2006c). While 
Resolution 1674 was the first explicit endorsement of the R2P paragraphs by the Security 
Council, the inclusion of R2P in this resolution was so controversial that a think-tank – 
Security Council Report – speculated afterwards that members might be unwilling to 
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engage with R2P again for some time (2006b). Instead, the Council referred to R2P again 
only months later, but with similar levels of difficulty.  
R2P remained highly contentious in the Security Council in 2006. Resolution 
1706 on Darfur authorized the transition from African Union peacekeeping to UN 
peacekeeping in August 2006. This resolution was the first time the Security Council 
referenced R2P in a country-specific resolution. In the preamble of Resolution 1706, the 
Security Council recalled Resolution ‘1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, which reaffirms inter alia the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 
United Nations World Summit outcome document’ (UN, 2006e: 1). For the UK it was 
important that the Security Council used R2P soon after Resolution 1674 to demonstrate 
seriousness about the concept, and again it was the UK and France who particularly 
wanted R2P included in Resolution 1706 (Author Interview, 2011a). The UK initially 
tried to include the full paragraphs of the World Summit outcome document in 
Resolution 1706 but during negotiations this was bargained down to a reference to the 
relevant paragraphs (Author Interview, 2011b; Author Interview, 2011c). Resolution 
1706 took six months to negotiate, with R2P as one of the most contentious aspects of 
the negotiations.  
Given that including R2P in Resolution 1706 was so difficult, it is worth 
elaborating on the negotiation process and how it became possible. In 2006 there were 
political and financial pressures for a transition from African Union peacekeeping in 
Darfur to UN peacekeeping (Hamilton, 2011: 74-82). Peacekeeping relies on the consent 
of the host state, which is usually obtained in advance, yet the government of Sudan had 
14 
 
stated repeatedly during 2006 that it did not give this consent (for discussion see Gifkins, 
2013: 112-113). To reflect the need for consent, China wanted standard language of ‘with 
the consent of’ the Sudanese government to be included in the resolution (UN, 2006c: 
5). China also did not want R2P included in the resolution (Author Interview, 2011c). It 
was important to the UK that the resolution included R2P, so the UK proposed a trade to 
China whereby R2P stayed in the resolution in exchange for language on consent 
(WikiLeaks, 2006). This was complicated by the position of the United States (US) who 
did not want language on consent in the resolution, given that there was no consent at the 
time of drafting, and they did not want it to appear that Khartoum could veto the proposal 
(Author Interview, 2011c). The UK proposed the unusual language of ‘invites the 
consent’ which was permissible for both China and the US (Author Interview, 2011a). 
With the UK actively championing R2P, 1706 became the first resolution where the 
Security Council had applied R2P to a country since its general endorsement in April 
2006.  
R2P was highly disputed in Resolution 1706 and took six months to find 
agreement, even then with abstentions from China, Qatar, and Russia. Indeed, a 
participant involved in these negotiations said that R2P was the most contentious part of 
Resolution 1706 (Author Interview, 2011c). Although it represented the first time a 
country-specific resolution had included R2P, it has been described as one of the ‘worst 
Security Council resolutions ever’ as it mandated legally binding peacekeeping, but 
could not be implemented (Lynch, 2010). The legacy of this resolution is significant then, 
as it increased the difficulty of using R2P language in later resolutions.  
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R2P in the background: 2007-2010 
Following from these experiences, the Security Council was reluctant to refer to R2P 
from 2007 to 2010 – indeed it only appears in one resolution during this period. This was 
Resolution 1894 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which included a similar 
statement to thematic Resolution 1674 and reaffirmed the paragraphs of the World 
Summit outcome document on R2P, but unlike the earlier resolution, R2P was included 
in the preamble rather than the operative paragraphs (UN, 2009). As a US State 
Department official noted, it was easier to negotiate a reference to R2P into the preamble 
of a resolution than into an operative paragraph (Author Interview, 2011c). Also during 
this period the Security Council was unable to find agreement on referring to R2P in 
further resolutions on Darfur. The negotiations towards Resolution 1769 on Darfur in 
2007 illustrate how politically charged R2P was for the Security Council during this 
period.  
The UK tried to include R2P in Resolution 1769 on Darfur but there was 
resistance from both China and Sudan. The transition to UN peacekeeping in Darfur, 
authorised by Resolution 1706, could not be implemented without the consent of the 
government of Sudan, which it refused to give, thwarting implementation of the 
resolution. Instead, a compromise was brokered for a hybrid peacekeeping force between 
the UN and the AU, authorised under Resolution 1769 in July 2007. An early draft of 
this resolution included a reference to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit 
outcome document, like the previous resolution on Darfur (WikiLeaks, 2007). The UK 
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wanted to include R2P in the resolution, but this was too controversial for China and for 
the government of Sudan and it was removed during negotiations (Author Interview, 
2012). Instead, Resolution 1769 cited Resolution 1674 without reference to paragraphs 
138 and 139 of the World Summit outcome document (UN, 2007: 1).  
This negotiation illustrates how difficult it was for the Security Council to include 
language on R2P during this period. Indeed, supporters of R2P within the Council were 
working from the assumption that it was better not to reopen debate on R2P in the 
Council at this time (Security Council Report, 2007). This level of difficulty was also 
reflected in Resolution 1814 on Somalia in 2008, which referred to thematic Resolution 
1674, but without an explicit link to R2P (Strauss, 2009: 305). Thus, the period from 
2007-2010 was characterised by resistance to R2P language from some Council 
members, and supporters of R2P accepted the political sensitivities of the time.  
 
Libya and beyond: 2011-2014 
The period from 2011 to 2014 has seen a dramatic increase in usage of language on R2P 
by the Security Council (see Table 1). During this period the Security Council has 
referred to R2P in country-specific resolutions on Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, South Sudan, 
Yemen, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic and Syria. It has also been cited in 
thematic resolutions on small arms and light weapons, genocide, the prevention of armed 
conflict, and peacekeeping operations. While it has been suggested that the Security 
Council became more sceptical of R2P after NATO’s intervention in Libya, in fact 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya mark the turning point where the Council began to 
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refer to R2P regularly in relation to specific conflicts. Indeed, as noted by Bellamy ‘the 
Security Council has proven more willing to use RtoP in relation to specific situations 
than it was prior to Libya...Rather than running from a delegitimised RtoP, the Council 
has embraced the principle post-Libya as it never had before’ (2014: 39). In this period 
the Security Council has referred to R2P more regularly in relation to both specific 
conflicts and thematic issues.  
It is not simply the frequency of R2P in Security Council resolutions that is 
striking; it is also the comparative ease with which language on R2P is included. 
Resolutions 1674 and 1706 in 2006 each took six months of negotiations, with R2P as 
one of the most difficult aspects of both resolutions. Whereas from 2011 language on 
R2P has been quicker and easier to negotiate for both thematic resolutions and country-
specific resolutions. For example, Resolution 2109 in 2013 – which referenced South 
Sudan’s primary responsibility to protect – was negotiated in less than two weeks with 
relative ease (Security Council Report, 2013b). Likewise, Resolution 2139 which 
referred to the Syrian government’s responsibility to protect, took two weeks of 
negotiations. There was some resistance from Russia on including R2P language in 
relation to Syria (Security Council Report, 2014a), but the language on R2P remained in 
the resolution and Russia voted affirmatively without expressing any concern about R2P 
in its statement after the vote (UN, 2014a). Using R2P language in relation to specific 
cases became easier and quicker during this period.  
The pattern of both ease and speed is reflected in thematic resolutions as well. 
The text for the first resolution on small arms and light weapons was drafted in less than 
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three weeks. Security Council Report noted that ‘Council members differed on a number 
of issues along traditional dividing lines’ including R2P, but language on women peace 
and security was more challenging in these negotiations than R2P (2013a). Likewise, 
Rwanda circulated a concept note to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan 
genocide, and the Security Council adopted a resolution two weeks later which 
reaffirmed paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit outcome document (UN, 
2014b). Rwanda engaged in bilateral negotiations on language for this resolution, and 
‘negotiations appear to have gone relatively smoothly’ (Security Council Report, 2014b). 
These examples stand in stark contrast to the challenging negotiations in 2006 which 
took a considerable diplomatic investment by the UK and France and took six months of 
negotiations to reach sufficient consensus. 
The key exception to this pattern of quick and easy inclusion of R2P in resolutions 
has been Syria. Resolutions on Syria have proved very challenging for Council members, 
but the presence of R2P language does not seem to have been the determining factor. A 
draft resolution in early 2011 condemned human rights abuses in Syria and recalled the 
Syrian government’s responsibility to protect, but proved too controversial and was not 
put to a vote (see Gifkins, 2012: 382). In October 2011, a draft resolution was put to a 
vote in the Council which referred to the Syrian government’s responsibility to protect 
and was vetoed by China and Russia, with abstentions from Brazil, India, Lebanon and 
South Africa (UN, 2011c). Russia made a statement after the vote that it was ‘alarmed 
by statements that compliance with Security Council resolutions on Libya in the NATO 
interpretation is a model for the future actions of NATO in implementing the 
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responsibility to protect’ (UN, 2011b: 4). In this statement, Russia made clear links 
between Syria and its concerns over the implementation of R2P in Libya. Bellamy has 
suggested that this link may be somewhat spurious as Russia has been ‘inconsistent at 
best’ in linking these two cases and Russia had expressed similar concerns over 
international coercion in earlier cases of Kosovo and Darfur (2014: 26 and 31). Russia 
also voted affirmatively for some subsequent resolutions on Syria which contained 
similar R2P language, suggesting that the language of R2P was not the determining factor 
(see Table 1).  
On Libya, there has been considerable academic discussion on the ‘pillar one’ 
language in Resolutions 1970 and 1973 which were framed as the Libyan authorities’ 
responsibility to protect (UN, 2011d; 2011e) rather than as ‘pillar three’ international 
responsibilities (see for example Hehir, 2016). The use of ‘pillar one’ language led 
Nossal to claim that ‘neither resolution invoked the Responsibility to Protect doctrine’ 
(2013: 117). Drawing from the ‘pillar one’ language in the Libyan resolutions, some have 
argued that R2P is still too controversial for states (Hehir, 2013; Morris, 2013). 
Analysing patterns in the Security Council’s use of R2P language – particularly in 
relation to the pillars – I discuss below what can be learnt about the current standing of 
the concept, from thematic resolutions, country-specific resolutions and voting patterns.  
First, the Security Council has not shied away from ‘pillar three’ language 
altogether, and been regularly willing to use ‘pillar three’ language in thematic 
resolutions. The Security Council has included R2P language in seven thematic 
resolutions up to the end of 2014. Each of these has referenced paragraphs 138 and 139 
20 
 
of the World Summit outcome document – including both national and international 
responsibilities – with the exception of Resolution 2170 on terrorism. The use of R2P 
language in thematic resolutions has become more frequent, with two resolutions prior 
to 2011 and five between 2011 and 2014. As noted above, these resolutions have also 
become easier and quicker to negotiate. Given that the first thematic resolution to refer 
to R2P took six months of intense negotiation, the later usage reflects an increased 
willingness for Council members to accept R2P language in resolutions, including 
references to ‘pillar three’.  
Second, as the proceeding discussion argues, the Libyan resolutions need to be 
understood in the context of earlier negotiations on Darfur. Resolution 1706 on Darfur 
and Resolution 1970 on Libya were the first two occasions when the Security Council 
used R2P language in country-specific resolutions. Given that innovation in resolution 
language can be intensely political, these early examples illustrate the limits of what was 
politically feasible at those points in time. Use of R2P language in Resolution 1706 – 
which included reference to all three pillars contained in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
World Summit outcome document – was hard-won by British and French drafters. After 
the failure of 1706, drafters were unable to even refer to this resolution in a 2007 draft 
on Darfur, even though it is standard practice to refer to previous resolutions (Author 
Interview, 2011b). The failure of Resolution 1706 did not make it any easier for states to 
advocate R2P language in resolutions. As such, when negotiating Resolution 1970, the 
advantages for drafters of drawing on ‘previously agreed language’ would likely have 
been outweighed by the disadvantages of associating with a failed resolution. Instead the 
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language was open for re-negotiation.viii While the full details of the negotiations towards 
R2P language in Resolution 1970 have not yet become clear, we can see that the ‘pillar 
one’ language used in this resolution became the template for later negotiations on 
different crises. Indeed, between 2011 and 2014 all country-specific resolutions with R2P 
language have referred to the states’ responsibility to protect. This chronology suggests 
that the use of R2P language was ‘set back’ by its association with Resolution 1706 on 
Darfur, but has since become acceptable to refer to R2P in country-specific resolutions, 
particularly in the form of ‘pillar one’.  
Third, voting patterns demonstrate that R2P language has become a broadly 
accepted practice for Security Council members (see Table 1). Between 2006 and 2014 
there were 30 resolutions which referred to R2P. Of these three had abstentions, meaning 
that 27 resolutions – 90% – had unanimous support from all fifteen Council members. 
This is approximately the same level of unanimous support that was achieved across all 
Security Council resolutions between 2000 and 2010, showing that the presence of R2P 
language does not counter general voting trends (Dunne and Gifkins, 2012: 523). This 
demonstrates that Security Council members – from all regions – are generally willing 
to support resolutions which include language on R2P. The three resolutions with 
abstentions are also telling. These were on Darfur, on Libya and on small arms and light 
weapons. As highlighted, Resolution 1706 on Darfur authorised a consent-based 
peacekeeping operation, for which there was no consent and it could not be implemented. 
Resolution 1973 on Libya authorised a non-consensual no-fly zone. These two are unique 
in Table 1 as resolutions where consent was a key issue. Given this, it is not surprising 
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that the Council members who abstained on these resolutions highlighted the issue of 
consent (on Darfur) and pragmatic questions around the use of force (on Libya) (UN, 
2006c; UN, 2011a). Unsurprisingly, issues in relation to consent and the use of force in 
specific crises remain the most challenging areas to find agreement (for discussion see 
Morris, 2016; Quinton-Brown, 2013). Similarly, Russia explained its abstention from the 
resolution on small arms and light weapons in pragmatic terms – that it wanted a 
provision condemning the supply of arms to non-state actors (UN, 2013: 4-5). This shows 
that there remain pragmatic questions for Security Council members on how best to 
implement R2P, particularly in relation to specific crises.  
Analysis of these three areas – thematic resolutions, country-specific resolutions, 
and voting patterns – reveals a nuanced position on the acceptability of R2P for states. 
Since 2011 states are far more willing overall to accept R2P language in resolutions and 
the negotiations are less divided. As this discussion shows, language usage in resolutions 
is not static. Language evolves over time, and resolutions reveal a ‘snapshot’ of what was 
acceptable to Security Council members at a given point in time. In 2006 R2P language 
only appeared in resolutions via significant diplomatic investment from advocates. These 
costs decreased over time and the use of R2P language became routinized. This does not 
mean that it has become devoid of meaning to states, as Russia’s resistance to R2P 
language on Syria in 2014 demonstrates. While language on R2P has become more 
acceptable in general – including ‘pillar three’ language – there is still more resistance to 
applying ‘pillar three’ language to specific crises. Pragmatic questions remain, 
particularly on the use of force and consent. Despite these ongoing debates on how best 
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to implement R2P, Security Council members have become far more willing to include 
R2P language in resolutions. The use of R2P language in resolutions reflects negotiations 
inside the Council and shows that the Council’s responses to crises situations are 
increasingly being viewed within the context of R2P.  
 
Conclusion 
Language on R2P in Security Council resolutions has shifted from contentious to 
commonplace. Unlike the argument that consensus was ‘lost’ after the Libyan 
intervention, analysis of the language in Security Council resolutions shows that it 
became markedly easier to reference R2P after 2011 than it was before. There was intense 
political debate and negotiation around R2P language when it represented an innovation 
in the Council’s use of language, but this has settled over time as acceptable ‘agreed 
language’ has been found for both thematic and country-specific resolutions. Since 2011, 
R2P has been regularly reaffirmed in a wide array of conflicts and thematic issues, and 
these drafts have become quicker and easier to negotiate. Patterns have emerged in R2P 
language, with thematic resolutions regularly citing both national and international 
responsibilities, and country-specific resolutions focusing on the language of national 
responsibilities. As the early negotiations highlight however, including any language on 
R2P was strongly resisted by some Council members in 2006. The resistance was so 
entrenched that a reference to R2P was removed from a draft on Darfur in 2007 and it 
was too difficult to explicitly cite R2P in a resolution on Somalia in 2008. This has 
changed. Security Council members are now more comfortable with language on R2P 
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and it is accepted practice to reaffirm R2P regularly, both on national and international 
responsibilities. These changes indicate that the early resistance to evolution in this 
language has given way and R2P has settled into ‘agree language’ which Council 
members are willing to accept and regularly reaffirm.  
The language in Security Council resolutions – in addition to ‘insider’ reports 
obtained from interviews, from Security Council Report, and via WikiLeaks – shows that 
R2P was highly contentious but over time has become a regular feature of the internal 
deliberations within the Security Council. While this article has focused on resolutions, 
it is worth noting that the same pattern holds for presidential statements made by the 
Security Council. The Council has used R2P in presidential statements more regularly 
from 2011, both in statements on specific countries and in statements on thematic issues 
(Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2014a). Situated as one aspect of the 
broader normative shift towards R2P, as evidenced by Bellamy (2015) and Glanville 
(2016), we can see the Security Council becoming increasingly engaged in Welsh’s 
‘responsibility to consider’ (2013). Via the advocacy of Council members which support 
R2P, it has become accepted practice for R2P to be one aspect of the negotiations when 
drafting resolutions and statements. Over time we can see R2P becoming a standard 
element of the internal negotiations within the Council and part of the way the Council 
frames its responses to crisis situations and thematic issues.  
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Table 1: R2P language in UN Security Council Resolutions 2006-2014 
    
Topic Date 
Resolut
ion 
R2P 
Responsibilities* 
Vote 
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The Great Lakes 
region 
27 January 2006 1653 State Unanimous 
The protection of 
civilians in armed 
conflict 
28 April 2006 1674 
State and 
international 
Unanimous 
Darfur 31 August 2006 1706 
State and 
international 
China, Qatar and 
Russia abstained 
The protection of 
civilians in armed 
conflict 
11 November 2009 1894 
State and 
international 
Unanimous 
Libya 26 February 2011 1970 State Unanimous 
Libya 17 March 2011 1973 State 
Brazil, China, 
Germany, India and 
Russia abstained 
Cote d'Ivoire 30 March 2011 1975 State Unanimous 
South Sudan 08 July 2011 1996 State Unanimous 
Yemen 21 October 2011 2014 State Unanimous 
Libya 27 October 2011 2016 State Unanimous 
Libya 12 March 2012 2040 State Unanimous 
South Sudan 05 July 2012 2057 State Unanimous 
Mali 20 December 2012 2085 State Unanimous 
Somalia 06 March 2013 2093 State Unanimous 
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Libya 14 March 2013 2095 State Unanimous 
Mali 25 April 2013 2100 State Unanimous 
South Sudan 11 July 2013 2109 State Unanimous 
Small arms and 
light weapons 
26 September 2013 2117 
State and 
international 
Russia abstained 
Central African 
Republic 
10 October 2013 2121 State Unanimous 
Central African 
Republic 
05 December 2013 2127 State Unanimous 
Central African 
Republic 
28 January 2014 2134 State Unanimous 
Syria 22 February 2014 2139 State Unanimous 
Central African 
Republic 
10 April 2014 2149 State Unanimous 
The prevention 
and fight against 
genocide 
16 April 2014 2150 
State and 
international 
Unanimous 
South Sudan 27 May 2014 2155 State Unanimous 
Syria 14 July 2014 2165 State Unanimous 
Terrorism 15 August 2014 2170 State Unanimous 
The prevention of 
armed conflict 
21 August 2014 2171 
State and 
international 
Unanimous 
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Peacekeeping 
operations 
20 November 2014 2185 
State and 
international 
Unanimous 
South Sudan 
 
25 November 2014 
 
2187 
 
State Unanimous 
Compiled from: United Nations Security Council Meetings Records. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/ 
* Refers to the language on R2P and whether it is framed around state or international 
responsibilities. Reference to paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit outcome 
document is counted as 'international'. 
 
i An earlier version of this article was presented as part of the ESRC Seminar Series on Intervention and 
R2P. Many thanks to Stephen McLoughlin, Alex Bellamy, Miriam Cullen, Holger Niemann, Bastian 
Loges, James Pattison and two anonymous reviewers for discussions and helpful comments on an earlier 
draft. I would also like to thank the guest editors for this special issue.  
ii For comprehensive analysis on when Security Council resolutions are binding, see Security Council 
Report (2008).  
iii Notable exceptions to this are Wood (1998) which discusses how to interpret the language used in 
Security Council resolutions; and Holt et al (2009) which analyses the evolution of language on the 
protection of civilians.  
iv Although Neumann’s analysis is primarily in relation to drafting speeches for the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry, he argues that his analysis is congruent with other the drafting processes for other foreign 
policy documents and in other country contexts. 
v Here I mean ‘precedent’ in a political sense rather than a legal sense. The Security Council is a political 
body and members choose to use previously agreed language, without legal obligation. 
vi I have excluded from analysis distinct language which is tied to the connected but distinct agendas on 
the Protection of Civilians and on Women Peace and Security, which use the phrases ‘protect civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence’ and ‘parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility 
to ensure the protection of affected civilians’ respectively. 
vii Additionally, between 2001 and 2005 there were eight Security Council resolutions on the conflict 
within Georgia which used the phrase ‘responsibility to protect returnees’. The use of this phrase stopped 
after the 2005 World Summit, however like others, I have not found any evidence to link this language to 
the ICISS version of R2P (Chesterman, 2011: 2-3). The change in language after the World Summit 
agreement may have been coincidental.  
viii For example, while Resolution 1970 recalled ‘the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its 
population’ an earlier draft added ‘under any circumstances’. See ‘UN SC Draft on Libya and list of 
sanctioned names’, Al Arabiya News, 26 February 2011, available at 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/26/139380.html 
                                                            
